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Abstract:  Budgetary slack is one of strategies taken by accountant to make himself pleasured. This strategy effectively prevents budgets from working properly.  It  can even be unethical in some cases.  This study aims to examine  the effect  of reputation,  ethics,  and self  esteem on budgetary slack with the LoC   as a moderating variable.  The subjects were consisted of 103 Accounting students at University of Bengkulu. The results showed that the reputation has positive effect on budgetary slack. This means that the higher the reputation of a person then the greater budgetary slack that occurs.  While,  the the second and third said that ethics and self-esteem has no effect on budgetary slack, which means that ethics and self esteem can’t directly affect budgetary slack. Moderating variable (LoC) had a role as a quasi moderator.
Keywords: reputation; ethics; self-esteem; budgetary slack; LoC
INTRODUCTION
Budgetary slack is the difference between the budgeted amount and costs or expenses that should be (Dunk & Perera, 1996 in Fitri, 2004). Budgetary slack can arise when managers intentionally set income is too low or too high for  costs (Hansen  & Mowen, 1997).Young (1985) in Welsch et al. (1995) found that an employee who participates in the budgeting process tend to incorporate slack into the budget. Looseness is in part due to  the efforts  of  subordinates  to  avoid risk.  Managers  look for ways to  protect themselves from the risk whether they cannot achieve the budget (Schiff and Lewin, 1970 in Fitri, 2004). Young and Merchant (1985) in Falikhatun (2007) have examined empirically  that  budgetary  slack  occurs  because  subordinates  provide  biased information  to  superiors  by  reporting  higher  cost  or  lower  reported  earnings. Sometimes, the rigid budgetary control can make subordinates to behave dysfunctional behavior (Lukka, 1988 in Hadikusuma, 2009).Budgetary slack can be occured by two factors: economic and non-economic. Tendency budgetary slack is not only related to economic factors, but also due to non-economic factors. One of non-economic factors is a personal factor. This non- economic factors  makes  the  gap  in  the  budget  implementation.  It  is  because  of  subordinate achievement not only motivated by monetary incentives (economic factors) but also motivated by other factors such as complex personal factors or social factors. Monetary incentive is not too enough to achieve a certain level of motivation (Hansen and Mowen,  1997).  This  study  examine  the  effect  of  budgetary  slack  related  to  non-  economic factors, such as reputation, ethics and self esteem.Many studies have attempted to explain the budgetary slack variables. Young and Merchant (1985) in Falikhatun (2007) pointed out that because of the desire to avoid  risk,  subordinates  engaged  in  the  preparation  of  the  budget  tends  to  make budgetary  slack.  Whenever  the  risk  is  higher,  subordinates  who participated in  the preparation of the budget will make budgetary slack. In the other study, Dunk (1993) in Falikhatun  (2007)  examined  the  relationship  between  participation  and  budgetary slack that uses information between subordinates and superiors, and superiors budget emphasis are used to assess the performance of subordinates. The results found that 
the interaction between participation,  budget  emphasis  and information asymmetry has a  significant negative  relationship with the budgetary slack.  It  could be done if  budget emphasis and information asymmetry is too high then the budgetary slack to be low and vice versa.In  addition,  recent  studies  show that  the  influence  of  individual  factors  on budgetary  slack.  Actually,  Dunk and Perera (1996)  in  Sari  (2006)  said that  budget participation and information asymmetries do not affect budgetary slack but personal factors. Blanchette, et al. (2002) in Sari (2006) said that budgetary slack  is something that is ethical and therefore contributes positively. Steven (2002) found that creating budgetary slack is  an unethical  thing.  Steven gave evidence that the reputation and ethics  is  negatively related to  budgetary slack.  Douglas  and Wier (2000) in  Maskun (2009)  found  that  ethical  position  (ethical  or  unethical)  is  relatively  dependent  subordinate perception that one side tends to increase budgetary slack, on the other hand tends to reduce slack. Nugrahani Research (2004), stating that ethics has no effect on budgetary slack.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
The Effect of  Reputation on Budgetary SlackReputation can  observed with social  norms  like honesty,  fairness,  and avoid failures  and  cheating.  Steven  (2002)  defines  reputation  as  a  desire  subordinate (subordinate) to act honestly and fairly in leadership. He gave evidence that reputation is negatively related to budgetary slack. Chow et al. (1988) in Nugrahani (2004) said that  personal  factors  such  as  ethics,  individual  integrity,  and  honesty  influence  on budgetary slack. Onsi (1973), in Nugrahani (2004) test that personal factors influence the budgetary slack. Brahmayanti (2006) found that reputation  had a  negative effect, which says the higher  reputation  the lower budgetary slack. Then, Nugrahani (2004) stated that the reputation affect negatively to budgetary slack. Based on the theory and those results, the first hypothesis is proposed as follows:H1 : Reputation negatively affect on the budgetary slack
The Effect of Ethics on budgetary Slack
According Penno (1984), positive behavior subordinate (subordinate) can be assessed  on  the  disclosure  of  information  regarding  its  performance  by  correctly mentioning the amount of a reasonable budget. Chow et al. (1988) in Nugrahani (2004), stating personal factors such as ethics, individual integrity, and honesty influence on budgetary  slack.  Douglas  and  Wier  (2000)  in  Maskun  (2009),  in  his  study  of  the influence of ethics on budgetary slack found that ethical position is relatively dependent subordinate perception that one side tends to increase budgetary slack, on the other hand tends to reduce slack. Blanchette, et al. (2002) in Sari (2006) said that creating a budget  gap  (budgetary  slack)  is  unethical  and  therefore  contributes  positively.  The results Maskun (2009) himself stated that the negative effect of ethics, the respondents considered unethical existence of budgetary slack, the higher the propensity to create budgetary slack and vice versa. Steven (2002) found that creating budgetary slack is an unethical  thing  and  provide  evidence  that  ethics  is  negatively  related  to  budgetary slack. Nugrahani (2004), stated that ethics has no effect on budgetary slack. Based on several studies related to ethics, the second hypothesis is as follows:H2 : Ethics negatively effect on budgetary slack
Effect of Self Esteem on budgetary SlackA person with low self esteem cannot work well as expected, he was not able to work and do not get satisfaction if it works well (Bateman, 1996). Belkaoui showed that the superior with negative feedback tends to estimate the cost budget higher than the superior with positive feedback. Otherwise when subordinate budget estimate sales, the budget could be  lower. Neutral feedback is estimated between positive and negative feedback. He claimed   self- esteem variables significant at alpha 5 percent, it indicates that self -esteem is able to explain the budgetary slack. Nugrahani (2004)  tested  self esteem, she said that it can be able to explain the budgetary slack. The results showed that self esteem can negatively affect the budgetary slack. So the third hypothesis that self-esteem is related to: H3 : Self Esteem negatively affect the budgetary slack
Locus of Control, the budgetary Slack, and Reputation
According Hjele and Ziegler (1981) in Engko (2007), Locus of control is defined as a perception of the causes of success or failure in carrying out its work. While reputation  is a case where someone wants to maintain an image in front of his superiors. Baiman and Rajan (1995) in Nugrahani (2004) suggested to describe the behavior of a person's reputation, both with regards to the control of economic and social control. To maintain one's image in front of your superior, then such a person has an ability to believe in the achievement  of  herself  in  carrying  out  a  task  that  has  been given.  In  addition,  the behavior of budgetary slack is an act that has certain consequences if the manager was really going to do it. An internal Locus of control manager  will know the consequences of budgetary slack to be done. Based these, the fourth hypothesis is proposed:H4  :  Locus  of  control  influence  the  association  between  the  budgetary  slack  and Reputation
Locus of Control, the budgetary Slack, and Ethics
According to Rotter (1966) in Brownell (1982), Locus of control is the degree to which a person  accepts  personal  responsibility  for  what  happens  to  them.  Harsono  (1997) concluded  that  ethics  are  matters  relating  to  issues  of  right  and  wrong.  Ethical development is an important thing for the success of the individual as a leader of an organization. Sari (2006) stated traits internal Locus of control are those who believe that an event is always in control and will always take on the roles and responsibilities in  the  determination  of  right  or  wrong.  So,  someone  was  going  to  try  as  much  as  possible to control a situation or event as a manifestation of a sense of responsibility.  With the carriage of a person like that, then one can determine what is right and what is  wrong. An individual who has good ethics, then the individual can know where he could be placed and can accept the responsibility of what happens to the individual. Then fifth hypothesis is proposed:H5 : Locus of control influence the association between the budgetary slack and ethics
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Subject
A  hundred  and  three  undergraduate  student  at  Bengkulu   University participated in the experiment.  Subject received course credit and compensation for participation in the study.  Insert Table 1.In this experiment participants will be assigned to carry out the production by making toys " paper boat ", it aims to act as if the participants establish and implement  a production budget of a company.Production will  be  performed three times.  First,  participants  were asked to perform the experiment of production for a minute before they actually do the actual  production. The aim is to give you an idea of how many units they are able to produce in one minute. After that, they were asked to determine how the production targets they can generate within two minutes, according to their ability to carry out the experiment before. Targeting is analogous to stage budgeting. Subsequently they started doing the first  production  for  two  minutes.  At  this  stage,  investigators  determined  the compensation to  motivate,  if  the  actual  production exceeded budgeted targets,  then every single unit that exceeds the target will be awarded a bonus of five points will be accumulated at the end of the session.For the second production, not much different from the first production, but here  researchers  who set  the  standards  of  production  and if  anyone  can  make  the production exceeds the standards that have been given, then the participants will be compensated. Here will see who can produce the production exceeds the standards set by the researchers. The time given for a second production well for two minutes. Finally,  participants will conduct the third phase of the production rules are still the same as the second production rule. It means that the budgetary slack happened.
Experiment scenarioProcedures  to  be  performed  in  this  experiment  to  study  the  behavior  of subordinates, is divided into seven stages:1. Directing duties on the participants, the researcher briefed the participants how to make a toy "paper boat" for about one minute.2. 1 filling questionnaires about self esteem for approximately two minutes.
3. Exercise trial production task, each participant attempted first making toy " paper  boat  "  for  a  minute.  This  was  done  to  determine  the  production  target  from  each participant according to their abilities.  Researchers together to guide and explain to each group.4. Exercise 1 production task, participants were asked to make a toy " paper boat " on target  production  of  each  participant  were  achieved  in  the  previous  trial  practice. Participants  will  be  compensated  by  5  points  if  the  results  of  this  first  phase  of  production exceed production targets participants who performed the exercise trial. Every single unit that exceeded the production target will be compensated 5 points, which will be the points will be accumulated. Time given by the researchers for two minutes.5. Exercise 2 production task, participants were asked to make a toy " paper boat " is not a suitable target is achieved in the experiment but with the production standards set by the researchers. If anyone could make production exceeds the standards given researchers, then participants will be compensated by 5 points. Every single unit that  exceeds production standards will earn 5 points compensation, which will be the points will be accumulated. For two minutes would be anyone who can do production exceeds a predetermined standard.6. Exercise 3 production task, participants were asked to make a toy " paper boat " with  the exact same workout 2 production tasks.7.  2  filled  out  a  questionnaire  containing  questions  about  reputation,  ethics  and manipulation  checks.  Manipulation  cheks  aims  to  test  whether  participants  truly understand the experiments conducted. Manipulation cheks compensation is related to production.  Manipulation  consists  of  three  items  cheks  questions  with  Likert  scale measuring 1 to 5 with the " strongly disagree " to " strongly agree ". Question on a scale  of 1 means the participants did not understand the experiments carried out and vice versa,  the  question  on  a  scale  of  5  means  that  participants  truly  understand  the experiments  were  conducted.  Further  to  fill  out  questionnaires  regarding  Locus  of control 3.
Operational Definition and Measurement of Variables
The  dependent  variable  in  this  study  is  budgetary  slack.  Budgetary  Slack: calculated  as  the  difference  between  the  subordinate’s  expected  performance  and chosen  budget  divided  by  the  subordinate’s  expected  performance   (Steven,  2002). While expected performances calculated as the average of production in the prior two periods is used to proxy for the subordinate’s expected performance.)The independent variable in this study is reputation, ethics and self  esteem.Reputation  is  defined  as  the  desire  to  appear  honest  and  fair  in  the  presence  of  a superior (Steven, 2002). Questions about the reputation consists of a single item with a Likert  scale  measuring  1  to  5  with  the  "  very  important  "  to  "  very  important  "  (Nugrahani, 2004) Questions  about  the  reputation  of  the  "  important  experiment  for  me (subordinate) if the superior thinks that I (subordinate) to set targets in accordance  with the true potential ". To answer such a scale of 1 means that a person does not feel very concerned and there is no desire at all to keep his reputation before the superior,  so it  is  considered to have a very poor reputation.  To answer 5 scale  means that a person feels is eager to do whatever is best to keep the image in front of his superior / her good name, so it is considered to have a very high reputationEthics means doing the right thing in making the budget target (Steven, 2002). Just like reputation, ethics is also composed of a single item question with a Likert scale measuring 1 to 5 with the " strongly disagree " to " strongly agree " that are used by Nugrahani (2004).To answer a scale of 1 means that the person feels in setting a target if it does  not fit with the actual production potential, an act which is very unusual in a job, so it is considered to have very low ethics.  To answer 5 scale means that a person feels  in setting a target if it does not fit with the actual production potential, an action that is not very good and it was regarded as something that is very detrimental to him if he did it in a job, so it is considered to have very high ethical.Self esteem means the confidence with all its potential (Field, 2003). This study uses  self  esteem  instrument  developed  by  Rossenberg  (1965)  has  been  translated Anwar (2003) which is also used by Nugrahani (2004) in his research. Question of self -esteem consists of ten items with a Likert scale measuring 1 to 5 with the " strongly 
disagree " to " strongly agree ". To answer a scale of 1 means that people with low self  esteem do not feel good with him, while for an answer scale of 5 means that a person has a high self esteem in which they see themselves valuable, capable and acceptable. Moderating variables that exist in this study is the Locus of control. According to Rotter (1966) in Sari (2006), Locus of Control is the degree to which a person accepts personal responsibility for what happens to them.Locus of control will be measured with an instrument developed by Spector (1988) in Mas'ud (2004) in the journal Development of the Work Locus of Control Scale, consisting of 16 questions using a Likert scale of 1 to 5 with the " strongly disagree " to " strongly agree". For internal Locus of control: statements 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 12, 15, and 16 For  external Locus of control: statements 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14
RESULT
Descriptive StatisticsOverview of statistical data between the study variables used descriptive statistics table below: Insert Table 2.Average production  capacity  of  1,  2,  and 3  is  equal  to  2.6990;  3.2427,  and 3.4272 units, with the average target is equal to 3.0291 units. Biggest budgetary slack is  1.0769. This indicates that the participants after determining a target,  he wanted to  achieve  greater than a  predetermined production targets,  but  instead produces  less output than what was targeted. In contrast, for the smallest budgetary slack -1.2000, this  means  that  the  participant  after  determining  the  target,  he  could  even  reach exceeds production target has been set.Variable self- esteem ranged from 25 to 43. This value is derived from the sum of 10 item self- esteem questions, using a Likert scale of 1 to 5. Self- esteem variables  obtained mean value of 33.91, which means in answering questions, more respondents answered  in  point  3  (neutral).  Possibility  of  participants  felt  he  had  a  sense  of confidence that is not too low nor too high.Reputation variable minimum and maximum values ranging from 1 to 5, using a Likert scale of 1 to 5.  The average value of 4.1456 which means the reputation of participants in answering the question revolves around the choice between a 4 (agree).  
Not occur doubt participants in answering the question. This is possible because the participants feel confident the researcher (superior) knows that he has set targets in accordance with the true potential of the participants, in which the existence of such a thing spur participants to maintain its image in the eyes of his superiors. This could  happen because of the possible supervision of the researcher than the professors who were present at the time the experiment took place.Minimum value and minimum ethics variable data is 1 and 5 by using a Likert  scale of 1 to 5. Descriptive statistics obtained from the average value of 3.3689 ethics.  This means that participants in answering the question of ethics,  on average choose between 3 (neutral). There is quite a bit of doubt in answering that question. Doubt in this  case  occurred  because  maybe  there  are  some  participants  who  still  do  not understand about ethical considerations.Variable Locus of control (LOC) that internal LOC ranged from 8.00 to 40.00. This value is derived from the sum of 8 item questionnaire, using a Likert scale of 1 to 5. This internal LOC variables obtained mean value of 29.79, which means in answering questions, more respondents answered in figure 2 (disagree) and 3 (neutral). Here we can see a whole lot more participants answered neutral which means it still  seemed hesitant to see a side of the incident comes from within ourselves. As for the external LOC  ranged  from  15.00  to  40.00.  This  value  is  derived  from  the  sum  of  8  item questionnaire, using a Likert scale of 1 to 5. This external LOC variables obtained mean value of 23.57, which means in answering questions, more respondents answered in figure 2 (disagree). participants answered a whole lot more do not agree that it means that the side view of an event based on other people and the environment that influence is still rather low. Participants say it has a medium level of external LOC soul.
Hypothesis TestThe first hypothesis, the second and third of this research is to use a linear equation is Y  = a + + b1X1 b2X2 b3X3 + ε. The regression analysis for the first hypothesis, the second and third are as follows :
Insert table 3.
Results of regression test the first hypothesis, the second and the third by the equation Y = a + + b1X1 b2X2 b3X3 + ε indicates the magnitude of R Square is equal to  
0.054,  the  calculated  F  value  is  1.882  and  Adj  R  Square  value  of  0.025,  with  a significance value of 0.038 equation (< 0.10) which indicates that the model equations fit.  The test  results  also showed the value of  a  constant  coefficient  of  0.473 with  a significance value of 0.245, which means that the reputation, ethics and self  esteem simultaneously affect the budgetary slack. For the first  hypothesis,  partially visible significance for the reputation of the 0,035 meaningful effect on the reputation of budgetary slack, with a coefficient of 0.091, which means a positive value. So it can be concluded positive effect on the reputation of budgetary slack, so that hypothesis 1 is rejected.The  first  hypothesis  test  results  do  not  support   Steven  (2002),  Nugrahani (2004),  and  Brahmayanti  (2006)  that  negatively  affect  the  reputation  of  budgetary slack. Hypothesized differences like this can happen which can be observed when the experiment took place, when they feel that their superiors knowing their true potential, then they work / production is not in accordance with the targets they have budgeted in other words they do budgetary slack. Conversely, when they feel their superiors do not know their potential, then they try to produce in accordance with the targets they have budgeted.  Thus,  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  known  potential  for  them  by  their superiors, the greater their desire to perform budgetary slack.For the second hypothesis, partially visible significance for ethics is 0.903 as p value> 0.10 means that ethics has no effect on budgetary slack. So it can be concluded ethics has no effect on budgetary slack, so that hypothesis 2 is rejected.Based on the results of testing the second hypothesis using multiple regression analysis showed that ethics has no effect on budgetary slack. These results indicate that the size of the slack is done by a subordinate, can not be seen from the level of one's  ethics.  It  means,  in  other  words,  ethics  can  not  directly  predict  the  existence  of budgetary slack.The second hypothesis test results do not support previous research conducted by Steven (2002) and Maskun (2009) that the ethics negatively affect budgetary slack,  and do not also support previous research (Blanchette et al (2002) and Van der Stede, 2002) which states that the slack is created or ethical conduct.This study supports the Nugrahani (2004) which stated ethics had no effect on budgetary slack, that ethics can not directly determine the existence of budgetary slack.
For  the third  hypothesis,  looks  coefficient  of  -0.007 with  significance  for  self -esteem  partially  because  the  p  value  is  0.091  <  0.10  means  that  the  self  -esteem negatively affect the budgetary slack. So it can be concluded that self- esteem negatively  affect budgetary slack, so that hypothesis 3 is accepted. These results indicate that the higher a person's level of self-confidence, the less budgetary slack is happening.The  third  hypothesis  test  results  support  previous  research  conducted  by Belkaoui  (1989)  and  Nugrahani  (2004)  that  the  significance  below  0.05,  then  self- esteem is said to be able to clarify the existence of budgetary slack. The results obtained in this study indicate the significance of the mean p value 0.091 < 0.01 then say self  esteem can see where budgetary slack.The fourth hypothesis in this study is whether the Locus of control moderates the effect of reputation on budgetary slack. Results for the fourth hypothesis testing can be seen in the following table :
Insert Table 4.
From the results of the table above,  shows the results of the fourth hypothesis testing using MRA models.  The  resulting value  of R Square is  equal  to 0.062 and Adjusted R Square of 0.033 indicates that  the model fit the  MRA is more than the previous model when it directly affects the reputation of budgetary slack.  So it is said that the Locus of  control may strengthen the reputation and influence of budgetary slack. Value of the F statistic is equal to 2.177 with a significance of 0.095, which means the fit equation 2 because of significant under 10% which is 9.5%.Based on the individual parameter significance test (t test), of the three variables used in the regression,  reputation has a significant effect (p  <0.10),  Locus of control variables can be considered as a moderating variable because it has significance 0.095 (at  0.10 level).  Due to the interaction between the hypothesized moderating variables with independent variables significant result,  then  according  to  the framework to identify moderating variables proposed by Sharma et.  al (1981)  then performed the second phase of testing whether the hypothesized moderating variables related to the criterion variable (dependent variable).  The results of data processing carried out by regression analysis can be seen in the following table:
Insert Table 5.
From the table above, note that the value of ZLOC coefficient of 0.048 with a significant level (0.178) between the Locus of control with budgetary slack because of p>  0.10.  These results showed no significant effect between the variables of Locus of control on budgetary slack. Based framework for identification moderator variables by Sharma et al.  (1981),  if the  interaction between Locus  of  control variables with budgetary slack has no effect, then the Locus of control variable is a moderator variable with the criteria of pure moderator.Equation results for the  fourth hypothesis suggests that  the Locus of  control moderates the effect of reputation on budgetary slack.  According to the framework to identify moderating variables,  then  the second stage  of testing whether the hypothesized moderating variables related  to  the criterion variable (Sharma  et al., 1981)  and didapatlah results that Locus of control as a moderator variable with the criteria as pure moderator variable. Pure moderator variable is a variable that does not interact significantly with the dependent variable (Sharma  et al.,  1981).  Influence the reputation of  the budgetary slack will  be even greater when influenced by Locus of control.Fifth Hypothesis TestingThe fifth hypothesis in this study is whether the Locus of control moderate the influence  of ethics on budgetary slack.  This  hypothesis using MRA (Moderated Regression Analysis) that had been treated with Equal3 when exposed multicollinearity is Y = a + + b1X2i b2X4i b3Abs + (X2i-X4i) + ε. Results for the fourth hypothesis testing can be seen in the following table:
Insert Table 6.
From  the  table  above,  the  results  of  the  fifth  hypothesis  testing  using  MRA models. The resulting value is the R Square of 0.026 and Adjusted R Square of 0.026.  Value of the F statistic is equal to 2.883 with a significance of 0.083, which means the  model is fit equation 3 as significant under the 10% that is 8.3%. Can be inferred Locus of control moderate the influence of ethical and budgetary slack. 
Based on the individual parameter significance test (t test), of the three variables used in the regression, ethics has a significant effect (p <0.10), Locus of control variable  is said to be a moderating variable because it has a 0.083 significance (at the 0.10 level).  Due  to  the  interaction  between  the  hypothesized  moderating  variables  with independent  variables  simultaneously  significant  results,  then  according  to  the framework to identify  moderating variables  proposed by Sharma et.  al  (1981) then performed the second phase of testing whether the hypothesized moderating variables related to the criterion variable (dependent variable). The results of data processing carried out by regression analysis can be seen in the following table:
Insert Table 7.
The table displays the value of ZLOC coefficient of 0.048 with a significant level (0.178) between the Locus of control with budgetary slack because of p > 0.10. These  results  showed  no  significant  effect  between  the  variables  of  Locus  of  control  on budgetary slack. Based framework for identification moderator variables by Sharma et al.  (1981), if the interaction between Locus of control variables with budgetary slack has no effect, then the Locus of control variable is a moderator variable with the criteria of pure moderator.Equation  results  for  the  fifth  hypothesis  suggests  that  the  Locus  of  control moderate the influence of ethics on budgetary slack.  According to the framework to identify  moderating  variables,  then  the  second  stage  of  testing  whether  the  hypothesized  moderating  variables  related  to  the  criterion  variable  (Sharma  et  al,  1981) and didapatlah results that Locus of control as a moderator variable with the criteria as pure moderator variable. Ethics can know the existence of budgetary slack when influenced by Locus of control.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study contributes to the literatures in participative budgeting by testing the effect of reputation, ethics, Locus of control on budgetary slack. The result from this  experimental study is contrast from previous study. In the prior study, budgetary slack is negatively associated with the reputation and ethics, but in this study, we find that 
reputation has a positive significantly impact on budgetary slack, while the hypothesis is said to negatively affect the reputation of budgetary slack, so the first hypothesis is rejected.The second hypothesis result showed  that ethics has no effect on budgetary slack, while the hypothesis is said to negatively affect the ethics of budgetary slack, so that the second hypothesis is also rejected. This study found that self-esteem negatively affect the budgetary, so that the third hypothesis is accepted.The fourth and fifth hypothesis states that the Locus of control moderates the effect  of  reputation  and  ethics  on  budgetary  slack.  These  hypothesis  are  accepted.This  study  contributes  to  predict  budgetary  slack  that  can  add  a  variable  Locus  of  control as a moderating variable.The time used in this experiment was too short for participants who did not have experience in doing the task at hand in the screenplay. Experience in performing the task participants are limitations to the present study. Thus, the task of determining relevant and appropriate in subsequent studies need to be considered further.
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Tabel 1




Gender MaleFemale 3865 36,89%63,11%Total 103 100%
Locus of Control:Internalexternal 949 91,26%8,74%Total 103 100%
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics (n= 103)Minimum Maximum Mean Std. DeviationProduction 1 1.00 7.00 2.6990 1.10998Production 2 1.00 7.00 3.2427 1.05222Production 3 2.00 7.00 3.4272 1.13416Expected Performance 1.500 6.500 3.16748 .950611Target 1.00 6.00 3.0291 .97474Budgetary Slack -1.2000 1.0769 .173168 .3614641Self Esteem 25.00 43.00 33.9126 3.29619Reputation 1.00 5.00 4.1456 .85644Ethics 1.00 5.00 3.3689 .99990Internal LOC 8.00 40.00 29.7961 3.95900Eksternal LOC 15.00 40.00 23.5728 4.04291Valid N (listwise)
Table 3
Regression Model of Budgetary SlackVariabel Koefisien t-Statistik Sig.
Constant 0,473 1,170 0,245
Reputation 0,091 2,141 0,035
Ethics 0,004 0,123 0,903





The Effect of LoC on Reputation dan Budgetary SlackVariabel Koefisien t-Statistik Sig.
Konstanta 0,173 4,946 0,000
ZReputasi 0,215 0,843 0,401
ZLoC 0,129 0,758 0,450





The Fourth Hypothesis TestingVariabel Koefisien t-Statistik Sig.
Konstanta 0,173 4,882 0,000





The Fifth Hypothesis TestingVariabel Koefisien t-Statistik Sig.
Konstanta 0,173 4,854 0,000
ZEtika 0,223 0,753 0,053
ZLOC 0,140 0,990 0,325





The Fifth Hypothesis Framework TestingVariabel Koefisien t-Statistik Sig.
Konstanta 0,173 4,882 0,000
ZLOC 0,048 1,358 0,178
R Square
Adj. R SquareF-StatistikSig
0,0180,0081,8430,178
